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This paper explores in how far interest groups can influence EU trade policy. It chal-
lenges the view that the delegation of trade policy to the EU level reduced the influence 
of (special) interest groups on policy outcomes. It finds that the collusive delegation 
argument has little support in the empirical literature and goes on to argue that this is 
due to flaws in its theoretical basis. In examining the multiple access points the EU 
polity offers for special interest groups and conceptualizing lobbying as a resource ex-
change between decision-makers and interest groups, the paper offers an alternative 
account of how EU institutions and interest groups interrelate. It concludes that special 
interest groups, contrary to civil society groups, can have a significant influence on 

























The EU is an enormously important actor in international trade. It is the world’s largest 
exporter and the second-largest importer after the US (Eurostat 2009). Its trade power 
carries particular relevance for developing countries. The EU is the biggest market for 
imports from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and exports more than twice as 
much to them as the US, Japan and Canada combined (Commission 2008). Trade is 
characterized as the EU’s “oldest and most successfully integrated common policy” 
(Meunier 2005: 8). At the same time, it is heavily disputed. Development groups for 
instance criticize EU trade policy as favoring the interests of European business at the 
expense of developing countries. All this suggests a particular salience for research in 
this area, but the existing literature is slim and far from clear (Dür/Zimmermann 2007: 
775-783). 
 
Let us look at a recent example: In 2006, a shift occurred in the EU trade strategy from 
a multilateral paradigm to a predominantly bilateral orientation with the Global Europe 
strategy (Abbott 2008: 2; Woolcock 2007: 5).1 Development groups criticize this strat-
egy a “corporate trade agenda” (Seattle-to-Brussels-Network 2006).2 The Commission 
counters these criticisms by presenting it as a “consumer agenda” (European Commis-
sion 2006: 9). The former interpretation suggests that special interest groups effectively 
captured EU trade policy, the latter that the Commission possessed considerable 
agency and independence from those interests and instead adopted a policy in the 
interest of the average European.3  
 
The literature makes it difficult to assess the validity of such colliding claims, as there is 
little agreement on which factors drive and determine EU trade policy 
                                                
   I thank Stefan Landt, Christa Roth, Dennis Scherer and Klara Sucher for their insightful comments on 
this paper. I am also grateful to Phum Sila-Trakoon for the support throughout and to Falko Heese for 
making me a sandwhich at the last minute. 
1  This shift is mainly due to the current deadlock of the Doha Development Round and effectively ends 
a self-imposed moratorium on bilateral trade agreements, which had been in place for 10 years. 
2  See also Oxfam et al. (2008) and WEED (2009). The main arguments of Global Europe’s critics are 
that the obligations demanded by the EU are too onerous and detrimental to developing countries’ in-
terests and that the EU does not envisage trade concessions in areas vital to developing countries, 
such as its protectionist Common Agricultural Policy. Some scientists have called for a new morato-
rium on bilateral Free Trade Agreements, arguing that they undermine the multilateral trading system 
and result in a power balance between trading partner that is even more unequal than in the WTO 
(Stieglitz/Griffith-Jones 2007: 9). 
3  Arguably, all Europeans except maybe freegans are consumers. 
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(Dür/Zimmermann 2007: 775f). The influence of interest groups is a particularly conten-
tious issue. A relevant strand of the literature argues that decision-makers can pursue 
trade policy in “splendid isolation” because the delegation of trade policy competences 
to the EU insulated decision-makers from interest groups.4 This view is also known as 
the “collusive delegation” argument. It is in keeping with the “consumer agenda”-view, 
but obviously not with the “corporate trade agenda” interpretation. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the intricate relationships between interest 
groups and decision-makers in EU trade policy. Specifically, it examines the collusive 
delegation argument to see how it matches empirical evidence and stands up to theo-
retical reasoning. The research question that underlies this is: In how far do interest 
groups influence EU trade policy? I find that the collusive delegation argument does 
not capture the reality of trade policymaking in the EU due to flaws in its theoretical 
basis and that special interest groups can have a significant influence on trade policy 
decisions due to the access they enjoy in the EU polity and because decision-makers 
have strong incentives to comply with their demands. 
 
I will begin by presenting the collusive delegation argument as it is commonly stated 
and identify the causal mechanisms that might cause trade policy to be shielded (2). A 
brief review of the relevant literature follows which places the collusive delegation ar-
gument in context and examines the empirical evidence for and against it (3). The last 
section offers an alternative account of how the structure of the EU affects the influ-
ence that interest groups can have on trade policy. To this end, I will outline the access 
points for interest groups in EU trade policymaking (4.1) and argue that the relevant 
decision-makers have strong incentives to respond to the demands of special interest 
groups (4.2). On this basis, I will criticize the causal mechanisms through which collu-
sive delegation is supposed to work (4.3). The conclusion (5) summarizes the main 




                                                
 
4  Throughout this paper, “interest group” will designate all kinds of groups who try to influence EU trade 
policy, “civil society groups” will denote interest groups who lobby for diffuse interests, such as NGOs 
and “special interest groups” or “business groups” will stand for groups representing concentrated 
economic interests. 
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2. Why trade is supposed to be insulated (in theory) 
 
The collusive delegation argument originated in studies of US trade policy-making 
(Destler 1996; O’Halloran 1994). It basically states that delegating trade policy to a 
higher level of government reduces the influence of special interests. Proponents of the 
argument in the context of the EU include Zimmermann (2006), Meunier (2005), Wool-
cock (2005) and Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2002). 
 
The starting point of the argument is a collective action problem.5 Political systems are 
seen as biased towards protectionism which inhibits economically efficient trade liber-
alization. This is because the costs of liberalization are concentrated to small groups of 
producers who have to face increased competition. The benefits, however, are diffuse 
because they accrue to consumers – a much larger group. The protectionist producers 
can mobilize much easier because their relative costs per member are higher than the 
relative benefits per member for the consumers. The consumers consequently face 
enormous free-rider problems which inhibit collective action. The result is a tragedy of 
the commons: what is in the long-term interest of all is not achieved because of the 
short-term interests of a few.6  
 
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 is often cited as an illustration of this. The rise in 
US protectionism and the tariff war it caused are widely seen to have exacerbated the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. To prevent such a tragedy in the future, the reasoning 
goes, the fast-track authority for trade negotiations was introduced which delegated 
authority for the negotiation of trade agreements from Congress to the President. This 
delegation from the principal (Congress) to an agent (President) is supposed to have 
insulated trade policymaking from the influence of protectionist interest groups, thus 
making the push towards liberalism in successive General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) Rounds possible.  
 
As Meunier (2005: 8) argues, the founders of the EU, such as Jean Monnet and Paul-
Henri Spaak, intentionally replicated this institutional arrangement by transferring some 
authority in trade policymaking from the member states to the Commission. As she 
                                                
 
5  See Olson’s seminal work on collective action theory (1971). 
6  This account is repeated all over the literature, not only by proponents of collusive delegation. In Foot-
note 24, an alternative explanation for the often-observed protectionist bias of trade policy is given. 
  7
puts it, the founding states “chose to centralize trade policymaking in order to insulate 
the process from protectionist pressures and, as a result, promote trade liberalization” 
with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. To summarize, the collusive delegation argument 
asserts that the playing field in EU trade policy is not level. Delegation of trade policy-
making has increased the autonomy of public actors vis-à-vis interest groups and thus 
reduced protectionism.7 Various causal mechanisms are put forth in the literature to 
explain this. 
 
Zimmermann (2007: 159f, 165f) argues that the Commission is strongly shielded from 
societal pressures. According to him, interest groups face “high access barriers” (2007: 
159, my translation) because the Commission is financially independent from them and 
does not rely on them for re-election, as it is appointed by the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament. Thus, maybe the two most important resources interest groups have 
at the national level (political support and financial contributions) cannot be used to 
access the Commission.8 Furthermore, interest groups face high information asymme-
tries due to insider knowledge the Commission possesses about the positions in the 
Council and of the third states it negotiates with as well as about its own regulatory 
agenda.9   
 
Meunier (2005: 8f) suggests two further mechanisms for why EU trade policy might be 
insulated.10 She argues that the intransparency of EU decision-making enhances pos-
sibilities for blame-shirking. National governments can credibly blame unpopular deci-
sions on Brussels and thus pretend to (protectionist) interest groups that they fight for 
special interests without actually doing so. Note that this only works if informational 
asymmetries in favor of the national executives exist. 
 
Moreover, delegation enlarges the constituency for which a policymaker is responsible. 
In a national context, the gains of protectionism can be reaped while the costs are ex-
ternalized to other countries. Protectionist interests such as French agriculture thus 
                                                
 
7  Incidentally, Deutsch (1999: 60f) argues the exact opposite. He posits that “in the case of the Euro-
pean Union, the disequilibrium (towards protectionism) is more pronounced than in a purely national 
context“. In his view, delegation made EU trade policy more susceptible to protectionist influences. 
See Fritz (2004: 73) for a similar view. 
8  In section 4.2, I will argue that the Commission relies on different resources, which EU-level interest 
groups provide. 
9  On the role of information asymmetries, see also Moravcsik (1994: 12f, 22f). 
10  She draws those mechanisms directly from studies focusing on US trade policymaking. 
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have an easy time lobbying their government. In the case of the EU, however, this is 
seen to apply to a lesser extent. The costs and benefits accrue to actors in the same 
constituency. British industry has to carry the cost of protectionist French agriculture, 
for instance. The Commission is thus expected to have more liberal preferences than 
the respective member states would have absent delegation because it is responsible 
for a larger constituency that is affected by the costs and benefits of protectionism at 
the same time. Because of this, it is expected to be able to oppose protectionist inter-
ests and pursue consumer-friendly policies. The same should largely hold for the 
Council, as its aggregated preferences, too, represent a larger constituency than in the 
case of a single national state. The voting rules are crucial for this, as a single protec-
tionist state could effectively veto legislation under unanimity, but not under Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV). 
 
Woolcock (2005: 247) finally argues that the EU system acts as a “double filter” for 
interest groups. His argument is very similar to that of Meunier (2005) in that it also 
sees the EU’s enlarged constituency as the key mechanism. He basically posits that 
officials at the EU-level have a good deal of discretion to find trade-offs between sec-
tors and member-states which results in greater bureaucratic control over trade policy-
making. 
 
In conclusion, a strengthening of public actors on the national and EU levels vis-à-vis 
interest groups could have been caused by (1) making the Commission financially and 
electorally independent from interest groups, (2) erecting informational asymmetries 
against those groups, (3) increasing possibilities of national governments for blame-
shirking and (4) enlarging the constituency affected by trade policy.11 These points will 
be relevant for the discussion in section 4.3. 
 
                                                
 
11  Moravcsik (1994: 8-14) provides further mechanisms that can strengthen the “state”, i.e. national ex-
ecutives, against societal influences. As proponents of collusive delegation, he cites informational 
asymmetries and enhanced possibilities for blame-shirking, but the other mechanisms he outlines do 
not seem particularly relevant for trade policy. He argues, for example, that by transforming domestic 
policy issues into foreign policy issues, the executives gain greater control over the initiation and 
amendment of policies. Trade policy, however, is already a foreign policy, so these mechanisms might 
not be as relevant here as in the case of social policy, for instance. Finally, he points out that ideas 
(e.g. the “European idea”) can provide new sources of legitimacy to executives. According to him 
(1994: 14), “ideas tend to have a particularly strong influence where the consequences of materially 
self-interested behavior are uncertain, indeterminate, or diffusely distributed across a large popula-
tion”. These conditions do not hold for trade policy, however (Frieden/Rogowski 1996). 
  9
3. Collusive delegation in the literature 
 
The field of EU trade policy is characterized as “essential though highly understudied” 
by Pascal Lamy (Meunier 2005, back cover). The literature on EU trade policy is com-
paratively slim and theoretically oriented (Dür/Zimmermann 2007: 775).12 This is sur-
prising, given the EU’s importance in international trade, and the importance of trade 
policy within the context of European integration. This section will put the collusive 
delegation argument into context and assess empirical evidence for and against it. 
 
Factors driving EU trade policy 
 
The theoretical literature is far from clear on the factors shaping EU trade policy. Some 
authors emphasize the role of ideas (Kahler 1985; Lüttiken 2006; Niemann 2004; 
Young 2007). Several others point to geopolitical considerations driving EU trade pol-
icy, for example in the cases of trade agreements with the former colonies in the late 
1950s or more recently with the Gulf Cooperation Council and the EUROMED agree-
ments (Antkiewicz/Momami 2009; Messerlin 2001: 200; Sapir 1998).  
 
Most relevant for the purpose at hand is a divide in the literature on the role that socie-
tal influences play. Proponents of the collusive delegation argument see societal influ-
ences as little relevant (Meunier 2005: 8-9; Nicolaïdis/Meunier 2002: 175; Woolcock 
2005: 247; Zimmermann 2006: 159f, 165f). Others stress the dominance of special 
interest groups in the formulation of trade policy (De Bièvre/Dür 2007; Dür 2007, 
2008a). There is little theoretical consensus whatsoever. The only thing everyone 
seems to agree on is that interest groups try to influence EU trade policy and that busi-
ness groups are relatively more successful in this than civil society groups 
(Dür/Zimmermann 2007: 777). 
 
Empirical evidence on the question of special interest groups’ influence is not wholly 
conclusive. Only a few case studies address the issue directly, others do so in passing 
while following a broader research agenda. Overall, however, the empirical evidence 
does not seem to support the collusive delegation argument, as the following subsec-
tions will show. 
                                                
 
12  See Dür and Zimmermann (2007) for an excellent literature review. 
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Empirical support for collusive delegation 
Zimmermann (2006: 189-91) probably provides the strongest empirical support for the 
collusive delegation argument. He looks at EU and US negotiations with China on its 
WTO accession in 2001. He finds that, in contrast to the US, individual firms did not 
manage to capture the EU position in these negotiations and concludes that industrial 
lobbies could less easily block and influence negotiation in the EU than in the US. He 
also stresses, however, that business groups supported the EU’s position in these ne-
gotiations, so there was no conflict which would have had to be overcome through col-
lusive delegation. 
 
For the case of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), Lüttiken (2006: 193) finds that the 
negotiating positions of Germany, France and Spain during the round did not mainly 
reflect economic interests, but were shaped by public discourse. This finding is maybe 
not surprising, considering that his method is a constructivist discourse analysis which 
is better suited to analyze discourses than the actual influence of economic interest 
groups.13 Cowles (2001: 167) similarly finds that in the Uruguay Round, the French 
government was not particularly responsive to French industry. The collusive delega-
tion is argument is not very useful in explaining this, however, as it seems that the 
French position was heavily influenced by other special interests, like agriculture 
(Keeler 1996). 
 
Hocking and McGuire (2002: 466) examine a trade dispute about certain US tax re-
funds which were seen by the EU as an illegal export subsidy. The authors show that 
the WTO dispute settlement case against the US that was subsequently started (and 
won) by the EU was only based on casual business consultation. It concludes that the 
“relative autonomy enjoyed by states deciding which cases to bring and pursue does 
not support the more extreme arguments that governments are mere messengers at 
the WTO for corporate preferences”. This is a very cautious conclusion and the article 
does not provide clear evidence for the collusive delegation hypothesis. While business 
did not directly support the case, neither was there strong opposition. Like in the case 
                                                
 
13  Lüttiken’s method is highly unorthodox. Dür (2008c) discusses several approaches to examining the 
influence of interest groups, but discourse analysis is not even mentioned. 
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study by Zimmermann (2006), there was no conflict between business and EU institu-
tions which would have had to be overcome by collusive delegation. 
 
Empirical evidence against collusive delegation 
 
A series of case studies of bilateral, interregional and multilateral EU trade agreements 
as well as interest group surveys indicate that special interest groups have a significant 
impact on EU trade policy. 
 
Two studies provide insights into the role of interest groups in bilateral agreements. Dür 
(2007) argues that the EU’s agreements with Mexico (2000) and Chile (2001) were 
responses to the lobbying of exporters who faced reduced market access due to Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) these countries had with the US. Coen and Grant (2005) 
look at the Transatlantic Business Dialogue which provides a framework for coopera-
tion between transatlantic business, the EU and the US. It is an informal process 
through which US- and EU-based companies and business groups can make joint EU-
US trade policy recommendations. The authors find that governments are “increasingly 
dependent on large firms for (…) information and (…) willing to delegate public deci-
sion-making to private business forums” (p. 64, emphasis added). This finding is espe-
cially relevant here because if governments had purposefully insulated themselves 
from special interest groups, then why would they be willing to delegate some compe-
tences back to those groups? 
 
The volume edited by Aggarwal and Fogarty (2004) provides a broad selection of em-
pirical case studies of interregional negotiations, e.g. with EUROMED countries, 
ASEAN and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. They test different hy-
potheses as to what drove those interregional agreements and find some pointers to 
the influence of interest groups. They conclude that “over all there is little evidence 
against a pluralist hypothesis: strong interest group support is correlated with the rise of 
interregional regimes in our case and the decline of this (…) positive support (…) with 
their failure to move forward (p. 226, original emphasis)”.14 They do not see interest 
groups as the sole factor in driving interregional agreements, but as one important fac-
                                                
 
14  A pluralist hypothesis assumes that government preferences are determined by way of competition 
between different interest groups. 
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tor. The collusive delegation argument, in contrast, would expect interest group support 
to be negligible. 
 
Several case studies find significant influence of special interest groups in various mul-
tilateral agreements and negotiations in the framework of the WTO. For the case of the 
Uruguay Round, von Schöppenthau (1999: 65-76, 110) finds by conceptualizing the 
negotiations as a two level game that German and French special interest groups had 
an important role in national preference formation and that the textile and clothing in-
dustry was particularly influential at the EU-level. His findings thus contradict those of 
Lütticken (2007) and Cowles (2001). Dür (2008) shows that the EU’s position in the 
Kennedy (1964-1967) and Doha (2001-ongoing) Rounds closely correlated with those 
of economic interest groups and concludes that this is probably due to lobby influence. 
Van den Hoven (2002) comes to the same conclusion regarding the Doha WTO Minis-
terial Conference. These findings strongly challenge the collusive delegation argument, 
as Woolcock (2005: 244) argues that the relative insulation of trade policy should be 
greatest in multilateral negotiations. 
 
Finally, some surveys of interest groups involved in EU trade policy (Beyers 2002; De 
Bièvre/Dür 2007; Mohr et al. 2005) come to the conclusion that interest groups spend 
considerable time and effort lobbying at the national and EU levels. While economic 
interest groups perceive their activities to have a significant impact on trade policy, this 
is less so for environmental and development groups (De Bièvre/Dür 2007). Similarly, 
Mohr et al. (2005: 20f) find that decision-makers in EU trade policy judge the strategies 
of business groups to have an impact on EU trade policy. Specifically, they see those 
strategies as more effective than the strategies of civil society groups. 
 
The problem with perceptions of influence is that they do not constitute proof. The find-
ings cited above are revealing, though, because interest groups are usually very quick 
to complain if they feel excluded, so they have little incentive to overstate the influence 
they have. The same goes for decision-makers who – if anything – could be expected 
to understate the influence of special interest groups, whose insider lobbying might 
decrease democratic legitimacy. Therefore, the survey findings summarized above 
indicate that special interest groups have a relevant influence on trade policy, but do 
not prove anything. 
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In sum, empirical support for the collusive delegation argument seems tenuous at best, 
as the studies that support it do so very cautiously, rely on dubious methods, or are not 
able to point out issues where EU decision-makers overruled interest groups. At the 
same time, several case studies make a strong case for the influence of special inter-
ests on trade policy in multilateral, interregional and bilateral trade agreements. The 
next section aims to explain why the collusive delegation argument does not ade-
quately match the empirical evidence. 
 
 
4. Why trade is not insulated (in practice) 
 
The easiest way to find out how influential interest groups are within EU would be to 
measure the influence they had on a given trade policy outcome. This is notoriously 
difficult, however, and the available methods all have important shortcomings (Dür 
2008c). I will offer a more cautious argument instead. First, I outline the “multiple ac-
cess points” (Pollack 1997) the EU polity offers for interest groups. In a second step, I 
will argue that the relevant decision-makers in the Commission and the Council both 
have incentives to respond to interest groups’ demands, because these possess valu-
able resources.15 Finally, I will see if collusive delegation really works as it is portrayed 
by drawing out some implications for its causal mechanisms, which were identified in 
section 2. 
 
4.1. Access to the EU polity 
 
This section looks at where and how interest groups can access EU trade policymak-
ing. I follow Pollack (1997) in arguing that the EU creates “multiple access points” for 
interest groups, providing them with opportunities they would not have in a purely na-
tional setting. He focuses on diffuse interests, but the general argument should be just 
as valid for concentrated interests.16 Access in the EU is regulated through a mix of 
formal and informal rules. Where possible, I point out the relevant foundations in the 
                                                
 
15  While analytically distinct, interest groups’ resources and access are highly enmeshed in practice. 
16  I would argue that Pollack’s (1997) finding that the EU offers increased access for diffuse interests is 
due to a selection bias, as he only examines environment, women’s rights and consumer protection 
policies. These policies are designed to protect those diffuse interests. This is different for trade policy, 
which is designed to ensure European competitiveness, i.e. for concentrated interests. 
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Treaties or in secondary EU law. I also try to show how access varies according to the 
type of trade policy instrument used (trade agreement or unilateral measure) and the 
phases in the political life of a trade agreement (initiation, negotiation and ratification).17 
I will first outline the general composition of interest groups who try to influence trade 
policy. Then, I will examine the three main access points for interest groups in this field: 
the Council, the Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).18  
 
Relevant interest groups 
 
The interest groups that lobby to influence trade policy can be roughly placed in three 
groups: Concentrated import-competing interests, concentrated export-competing in-
terests and diffuse interests. Concentrated import-competing interests face concen-
trated benefits and costs from trade policy. Because they are competing with imports 
from third countries, they are in favor of protectionism, i.e. keeping rival products out. In 
the case of the EU, these are usually farmers, the textiles industry, audiovisual services 
and steel producers.19 Concentrated export-competing interests, on the other hand, are 
globally competitive industries, that benefit from market access in third countries. Too 
much protectionism is damaging for these groups as it reduces the EU’s capacity to 
push for concessions in international trade negotiations. They are thus in favor of liber-
alization. Examples include much of European industry, financial services providers, 
etc. Diffuse interests in the case of trade policy are development and environment 
NGOs as well as consumers. 
 
Interest groups have adapted to the changes brought about by European integration 
and have formed EU level interest groups beside the already existing national interest 
groups.20 EU-wide business groups are also called Eurogroups. While those groups 
                                                
 
17  See Woolcock (2000) for a discussion of these phases. On the distinction between different types of 
measures see Fritz (2004: 63-70). 
18  The European Parliament is left out as it can only influence trade policy decisions if a broader associa-
tion agreement with trade commitments is negotiated. Even then, it cannot change the proposal under 
the assent procedure, which only requires a simple majority in the Parliament. 
19  Some import-competing interests want both: market access abroad and protection at home. Agricul-
ture is an example. As the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy increases production and subsidizes ex-
ports, market access is also relevant for these interests. I still classify such groups as generally protec-
tionist because protection at home is the prerequisite for benefiting from foreign market access for 
these groups, as they depend on protection to ensure competitiveness. 
20  Nugent (2006: 336) puts it succinctly: “Pressure groups go where power goes.“ 
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generally lobby at the EU level, national interest groups concentrate on the national 
level.21 
 
Diffuse groups are viewed as far less influential than the other two groups (De 
Bièvre/Dür 2007; Kröger 2008: 25; Woolcock 2005: 244). This may be because trade 
policy is structurally biased in favor of concentrated interest groups as it confers con-
centrated costs and benefits on organized groups while diffuse costs and benefits ac-
crue to the rest of society (Frieden/Rogowski 1996).22  
 
Note that this classification differs from the starting point of the collusive delegation 
argument in one important respect. The collusive delegation argument leaves export-
competing interests out of the picture by assuming that the interests of concentrated 
import-competing interest groups clash with those of consumers. In the perspective 
adopted here, import-competing interests clash mainly with export-competing inter-
ests.23 The demands that politicians face from interest groups are thus heterogeneous, 
while the collusive delegation argument sees a relatively homogeneous interest con-
stellation that is biased towards protectionism.24 
 
The Council, the committees and the member states 
 
Trade policy is usually handled by the General Affairs Council of the EU, i.e. by the 
foreign ministers of the 27 member states. One important exception is the EU’s position 
on trade in agricultural goods which is effectively determined by the Council of agricul-
ture ministers. Ultimate control over much of EU trade policymaking resides in the 
Council which is generally closed to interest groups (Matyja 2007: 161; Richardson 
2006: 262). The Council retains tight control over the Commission’s competences. A 
number of specialized committees, most importantly the Permanent Representatives’ 
Committee (COREPER) and the Art.133-Committee, oversee the Commission’s ac-
tions and report to the Council. Voting requirements in the Council are another control 
                                                
 
21  This is only a rule of thumb. Especially national interest groups and individual firms lobby at the EU-
level as well. 
22  But see Gerlach (2006) on the organizational problems that business groups face. 
23  Illustratively see UNICE (1999), where the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of 
Europe (UNICE, now Business Europe) calls for agricultural protection to be significantly scaled back. 
24  The often-observed bias of trade policy towards protectionism could be explained though increased 
uncertainty that exporters face. While protectionist groups know what they stand to gain or lose from a 
policy because they want to protect their already existing business, exporters face uncertainty about 
the benefits of market access abroad (Dür 2007). 
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mechanism. According to Article 133 of the Nice Treaty (formerly Article 113), the 
Council can authorize the Commission to conduct trade negotiations and ratify negoti-
ated agreements with a qualified majority.25 However, since the inception of a common 
trade policy, unanimity voting has been the norm. This was first by design in the Treaty 
of Rome (1957), then continued to be so because of the Luxembourg Compromise 
(1966) and has largely stayed this way until today (Deutsch 1999: 55; Dür 2008a: 31; 
Zimmermann 2006: 162). The unanimity requirement makes sure that individual mem-
ber states can veto a trade agreement at the onset of negotiations or by refusing to 
ratify after negotiations.26 National interest groups can thus push their government to 
block a trade agreement that runs counter to their interests (Dür 2008a: 31). Conse-
quently, member states are a focal point of lobbying efforts in EU trade policymaking.27 
 
The degree as well as the nature of the access interest groups enjoy at the national 
level varies. As an examination of access in the 27 member states is beyond the scope 
of this paper, I will draw some analytical distinctions to illustrate how this access can 
vary.28 Patterns of interest intermediation in EU member states are usually character-
ized as pluralist, corporatist or statist (Bartolini 2005: 293; Deutsch 1999: 77). Pluralism 
denotes a highly open political process, where many interest groups compete for ac-
cess and representation. Access is generally possible for a large number of interest 
groups, but which groups gain access depends on their relative power and importance 
as well as on external factors. Examples include Portugal or Ireland.29 Corporatism 
describes a more institutionalized form of interest intermediation, in which some inter-
est groups have a monopoly of representation in a given policy area. Consequently, a 
smaller number of interest groups enjoy access, but the relationship between those 
interest groups and the state runs deeper. Examples include Germany, Denmark and 
the Netherlands. Statism means that the state is comparatively strong vis-à-vis interest 
groups. These groups consequently enjoy little access to policy formulation, but the 
access to policy implementation seems to be better (Schmidt 1999). Examples include 
                                                
 
25  When intellectual property rights and services are involved, unanimity is required as laid out in Art. 133 
(5, 6). 
26  Through the committees the Commission has to report to, the Council also has some influence during 
negotiations, even though the Commission is the sole representative of the EU in trade talks. 
27  De Bièvre and Dür (2005) argue that this is by design as member states wanted to ensure that they 
would remain targets of lobbying despite delegation. 
28  This is an illustration and in no way exhaustive. Furthermore, it is not directly relevant to criticize the 
collusive delegation argument, which focuses on the effects of institutions at the EU-level. 
29  The examples for pluralism, corporatism and statism are drawn Falkner (2000: 96) and Deutsch (1999: 
86). Disagreements exist on how to classify some countries. The UK and Spain, for instance are 
sometimes characterized as pluralist, sometimes as statist (Falkner 2000: 97). 
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France and Spain. These idealtypic classifications have to be handled with caution, 
however, as access varies across issues and interest groups (Falkner 2000: 95-97). 
Even though France is characterized as statist, for instance, agricultural interest groups 
are influential to the point of capturing the French position on agricultural trade (Keeler 
1996). 
 
In any case, good access at the national level seems to facilitate access at the EU 
level, as domestically strong interest groups are also stronger at the European level 
(Beyers 2002; Eising 2004; Kriesi et al. 2007). The reason seems to be that these 
groups can extend their existing policy networks to the EU level (Beyers 2002: 593). 
 
Apart from lobbying at the national level, interest groups target the permanent repre-
sentatives of member states in Brussels, who directly participate in trade policy formu-
lation through the COREPER and where access is much easier than in the Council. 
 
As a result, even though the Council as such is generally isolated from direct lobbying, 
strong indirect access channels exist via the member states and the specialized com-
mittees. This access is most useful at the initiation and ratification stages of a given 
trade agreement, as this is where the competences of the Council are greatest. As 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace (1997: 22) put it: “although (interest) groups have no 
formalized relationship with the Council, their influencing efforts pervade the atmos-




According to the already mentioned article 133, the Commission makes proposals on 
the initiation of trade negotiations and the content of those negotiations to the Council. 
It also conducts the negotiations and presents the negotiated agreement to the Council 
for ratification. 
 
Authority in the Commission is fragmented, as different Directorate-Generals (DG) can 
be involved in trade negotiations (Johnson 1998: 54). While general responsibility for 
trade policy lies with the DG Trade, the DGs Competition and Internal Market can be-
come involved as well. The DG Agriculture is especially influential and is usually seated 
at the negotiating table in WTO-negotiations. By essentially outsourcing trade in agri-
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cultural goods to this specialized agent, the impact the protectionist farmers’ lobby can 
have on policy decisions has been amplified (De Bièvre/Dür 2005: 1283). 
 
Overall, the relationship between the Commission and interest groups is very close, 
even “symbiotic” (Mazey/Richardson 2003: 218). Broadly speaking, the Commission 
offers access to interest groups in two ways: (1) through large, open gatherings and (2) 
through more restrictive committees, forums and a “myriad of bilateral meetings” 
(Mazey/Richardson 2006: 255). 
 
In trade policy the first way is through regular consultations in the Trade Civil Society 
Dialogue.30 It is generally directed at civil society groups, whose absence in trade poli-
cymaking has long been criticized, but business groups participate, too. While these 
groups can voice their opinions in this forum, this is not seen to have a significant im-
pact by researchers (Woolcock 2005: 244) and indeed by the participants themselves 
(Corporate Europe Observatory 2009). 
 
The second access route is more restrictive, but also more promising, as the actual 
content of policies can be influenced (Mazey/Richardson 2006: 255). In a variety of 
fora, business groups can voice their concerns, while civil society groups enjoy little to 
no access. For example, high-level contacts between representatives of Eurogroups 
and Commission officials are frequent (Nugent 2006: 343) and the Commission actively 
engages in building networks with those groups (Benington/Harvey 1998). Further-
more, trade policymaking usually engenders a plethora of advisory committees, work-
ing parties and expert committees on specific issues, where business interests enjoy 
excellent access (Johnson 1998: 20f). What is more, the Commission sometimes car-
ries out extensive business surveys, where business groups can voice their concerns 
before trade negotiations are started (Dür 2008a: 39). The EU’s position in a given bi-
lateral, regional or multilateral negotiation is thus drawn up in close consultation with 
special interest groups. This can lead to situations, where “companies and the Com-
mission present the member states with a negotiating strategy ‘pre-approved’ by Euro-
pean industry” (Cowles 2001: 171). 
 
                                                
 
30  See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/civilsoc/csd_proc.cfm. In some instances, open consultations are also 
launched for specific trade negotiations (Dür 2008a: 39). 
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This access is most relevant in the initiation phase, where the Commission has the 
greatest competences. Some access exists during negotiations, as the Commission 
maintains close informal contact with business groups, but since the negotiating man-
date is given by the Council in the initiation phase, the general direction of the negotia-
tions cannot be altered anymore. Access during ratification is less relevant, because 
this competence is in the hands of the Council. 
 
So far, this analysis has focused only on trade agreements, where the Commission has 
important competences, but is secondary to the Council. It is a different story for unilat-
eral trade measures, where the Commission has far greater powers. One example of 
such a measure are anti-dumping duties which can be unilaterally levied by the EU 
against foreign producers if “dumping”, i.e. predatory pricing, is perceived to have taken 
place. As the other available unilateral trade measures, this is a protectionist instru-
ment and thus mainly appeals to import-competing interests.31 
 
Import-competing interest groups or individual businesses can complain about dumping 
on the part of foreign producers to the Commission’s Anti-Dumping Unit in order to 
have protectionist anti-dumping duties approved. The legal basis for this is the EC 
Regulation 2423/88. The Commission can impose provisionary anti-dumping duties 
alone, but definitive anti-dumping duties have to be approved through a vote in the 
Council.32 This approval threshold was lowered from QMV to a simple majority in the 
Council in 1994 (EC Regulation 3283/94). In the same year, anti-dumping duties were 
made more effective by including an additional duty for cases in which the foreign ex-
porter tries to bear the cost of dumping himself and does not increase the price on the 
EU market (EC Regulation 3283/94). Interest groups are almost always the initiator of 
anti-dumping proceedings (Deutsch 1999: 54). Furthermore, the provisions are formu-
lated in such a way that ”it is generally not too difficult to find dumping“ (Woolcock 
2005: 242).33 In 1994 consumers and processing industry34 were given a voice in these 
proceeding for the first time, but this has not done much to reduce the strong influence 
                                                
 
31  The following discussion focuses on anti-dumping duties, as it is the most commonly used unilateral 
trade measure of the EU (Fritz 2004: 66f). Other available measures are anti-subsidy measures, which 
are directed at foreign countries, not producers, and safeguard measures. For a discussion of those 
instruments, see Fritz (2004: 63-70). 
32  Provisionary anti-dumping duties are imposed for 6 months. 
33  Note that Woolcock, who is a proponent of collusive delegation, does not dispute the strong influence 
that special interest groups have over unilateral trade measures. 
34  Processing industry relies on intermediary goods from third states, so anti-dumping duties can be 
damaging to them as they might raise the price of those goods. 
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of import-competing interest groups. The Commission also has authority to negotiate 
voluntary export restraints with third countries in place of anti-dumping duties (Fritz 
2004: 68). 
 
A similar access point exists for export-competing interests. The Trade Barriers Regu-
lation Unit and the Market Access Unit of the Commission process export-competing 
industries’ complaints on market access problems in trade in goods, services, or in the 
application of intellectual property rules. If necessary, the Commission is to process 
them into a WTO dispute settlement case (EC Regulation 3286/94).35 Thus, the Com-
mission is entrusted to service import-competing and export-competing interests with 
what they value most: protection at home and market access abroad, respectively. 
 
The European Court of Justice  
 
When interest groups do not gain satisfaction at the national level, the Council or the 
Commission, the ECJ comes into play.36 Here, interest groups can pursue a litigation 
strategy which is costly but can overturn EU policies (Mazey/Richardson 2006: 261). 
Basically, interest groups can challenge community decisions in two ways: (1) through 
actions for annulment on the basis of Article 230 EC and (2) through actions for failure 
to act on the basis of Article 232 EC (Farr 1998: 93). 
 
Through an action for annulment, a direct challenge can be made against a Community 
measure which is claimed to be illegal. Article 230 is couched in such a way that a pri-
vate complainant, i.e. a natural or legal person, has to prove that he is directly affected 
by a measure before an action can be brought. In practice, this means that private 
complainants generally cannot overturn international trade agreements (Arnull 2006: 
56f). Judicial review by private complainants is thus limited to unilateral trade meas-
ures. The formulation of Article 230 also means that concentrated interests have better 
access to this mechanism, as they have an easier time proving a direct effect to their 
business resulting from a given regulation, for example. Diffuse interests like consumer 
organizations or environment groups usually cannot even bring such cases before the 
                                                
 
35  The Commission cites several “success stories”, where market access was gained on behalf of Euro-
pean companies due to a WTO-ruling http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/tbr/index_en.htm. 
36  In 1994, the Council transferred the appeals procedures for private complainants to the Court of First 
Instance. The Court of First Instance has been created in 1989 to reduce the enormous workload of 
the ECJ. If a case cannot be resolved there, it is transferred to the ECJ. 
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Court where trade measures are concerned (Arnull 2006: 74-78; Farr 1998: 97f).37 To 
cite two examples, individual companies or business groups can bring a case when the 
Council decides not to transform a provisionary anti-dumping duty into a definitive one, 
or processing industry dependent on intermediary products from third countries can 
bring a case against definitive anti-dumping duties that make these products more ex-
pensive. 
 
An action for failure to act provides a remedy when EU Institutions fail to act where 
they are obliged to do so under the Treaties. In the context of trade policy, this means 
that a complainant can bring such an action if the Commission refuses to open an anti-
dumping or a market access investigation. It should be emphasized that the legal 
pathway is distinct from lobbying and that the privileged access special interest groups 
enjoy here is not a result of their capacity for collective action but rather of the proce-




Mazey and Richardson (2006: 251) posit that “(the EU) is incredibly open and perme-
able to interest group lobbying compared with even the more pluralistic member 
states”. As the above has shown, there is no reason to believe that this should be dif-
ferent for trade policy. Table 1 summarizes the different access points for special inter-
ests. What is maybe most remarkable in trade policy is that member states as princi-
pals have delegated trade policymaking authority to a number of specialized agents 
within the Commission. Some of those agents are designed to service export-
competing interests (DG Trade, Market Access and Trade Barriers Regulation Units), 
others to service import-competing interests (DG Agriculture and Anti-Dumping Unit). 
Access is merely a necessary condition for influence, however, and not a sufficient 
one. In the following section, I will examine the incentives of decision-makers at the 
national and EU levels to respond to the demands of interest groups, i.e. provide them 
with influence on actual policy content. 
 
                                                
 
37  The ECJ has not always been open for private complainants. The first case in which a company was 
heard in an anti-dumping case was in 1979. Since then, legal battles have been fought throughout the 
1980s and 1990s over the exact conditions under which private parties are able to contest EU regula-
tions (Arnull 2006: 74-81). 
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Table 1: Access points for special interests 
 
 Council Commission ECJ 
Trade ag-
reements 
Indirect access via mem-
ber states and committees 
Direct access via 






Indirect access to imposi-
tion of definitive measures 
via member states and 
committees 

























No access Direct access to 
initiation of market 
access investiga-
tions through com-
plaints, possibility to 
have case trans-
ferred to WTO dis-
pute settlement 
Litigation trough 
action for failure to 
act if Commission 
refuses to initiate 
market access in-
vestigations 
Source: Table by author 
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4.2. The incentives of decision-makers to conform to the demands in-
terest groups 
 
Here, I depart further from the collusive delegation argument. I lay the groundwork by 
offering a competing account of how the preferences of decision-makers are formed 
and then go on to conceptualize public-private relations in the Council and the Com-
mission as a resource exchange between rational actors in which special interest 
groups enjoy a privileged position. I close by outlining some conditions under which this 
can translate into influence on policy outcomes. 
 
Preferences in a resource exchange perspective 
 
The collusive delegation argument assumes that politicians delegated trade policy be-
cause they had consistently more liberal preferences than their constituencies. Accord-
ing to the collusive delegation argument, protectionist interests exerted a lot of influ-
ence before delegation of trade policy because politicians followed a short-term logic.38 
If politicians had sought to maximize welfare in the long term, collusive delegation 
would not have been necessary, since politicians would automatically have imple-
mented liberal policies. But if politicians only worried about short-term gains, then why 
would they have had incentives to insulate themselves from special interest groups in 
the first place? The collusive delegation argument posits that decision-makers in the 
EU collectively learned to follow a long-term (liberal) logic “with the memory of the in-
ternational consequences American protectionism still fresh in their minds” (Meunier 
2005: 9). This seems implausible, however, if we look at how many access points for 
protectionist interests the same decision-makers designed into the EU polity. Irrespec-
tive of the positions of such prominent figures as Jean Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak, it 
is not obvious why politicians should have a clear preference for liberal policies, inde-
pendent of their constituencies’ demands (De Bièvre/Dür 2005: 1291).39 
 
                                                
 
38  This assumption is very widespread in the political economy literature, where politics is often charac-
terized as a “political market”, where politicians offer electoral programs (goods) to voters, who “buy” 
those with their votes. Accordingly, politicians’ incentives are heavily biased towards the short term – 
they don’t see further than their electoral horizon. 
39  Frey and Buhofer (1986) even argue that it can be in the self-interest of an agent to be more protec-
tionist than his constituency. 
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This becomes clear when we look at lobbying as a rational exchange of resources be-
tween public and private actors.40 In this view, preferences of decision-makers are in-
fluenced by the demands voiced by their constituencies. Special interest groups are in 
a privileged position to be heard as they offer valuable resources to public actors at the 
national and EU levels, such as information, political support and financial contributions 
(De Bièvre/Dür 2005: 1275). Bouwen (2002) calls those resources “access goods”, as 
public actors reward the provision of those goods with access to political institutions. 
Because public actors are dependent on the resources that interest groups provide, 
they have incentives to respond to the demands of these groups. Decision-makers in 
the Council and the Commission, the most relevant bodies in EU trade policymaking, 
rely on interest groups in different ways. 
 
Public-private resource exchange in the Council and the Commission 
 
The Council consists of the representatives of nationally elected governments and thus 
has political interests. Politicians can be dependent on the three resources mentioned 
above which are mainly supplied by national interest groups. As politicians face uncer-
tainty about election results, they want to secure re-election. Accordingly, they have 
incentives to satisfy the demands of interest groups so as to avoid organized opposi-
tion to them or the organized support of a competing candidate. In trade policy, interest 
groups are in a privileged position to provide the relevant resources (De Bièvre/Dür 
2005: 1279). They can lend political support to candidates, thereby indirectly increasing 
their chances of electoral success.41 Farmer organizations, for example, very clearly 
possess electoral significance (Nugent 2006: 346), but other economic interest groups 
do so as well (De Bièvre/Dür 2005). Concentrated interest groups possess structural 
power as the investment decisions they make have a direct influence on a given mem-
ber state’s economy. The jobs they provide are a particularly relevant expression of this 
power, as it can be very damaging for politicians if they are portrayed as having caused 
a sector of the economy or an individual company to cut back on employment. Finan-
cial contributions can also play a role, although probably less so than in the US, where 
election candidates are heavily dependent on private contributions to run their cam-
                                                
 
40  A recent application of the exchange approach to the EU can be found in Bouwen (2002, 2004). 
41  This support is indirect because economic interest groups, being concentrated interests, do not repre-
sent a majority of voters. Direct support through voting alone is thus not likely to significantly impact 
election results. 
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paigns. Information about domestic economic interests, finally, also seems important 
as economic interest groups are in a better position to monitor their gains and losses 
than national governments. To the extent that this information can be relevant for elec-
toral outcomes and domestic policy, this might play a role as well. 
 
The picture is different for the Commission which pursues bureaucratic interests. It is 
electorally and financially independent from interest groups which rules out political 
support and financial contributions, but leaves two kinds of information resources on 
which the Commission is dependent: expert knowledge and information about Euro-
pean economic interests which are mainly supplied by Eurogroups. As the Commission 
is characterized by an “extensive policy agenda and limited policy resources” 
(McLaughlin et al. 1993: 201), it needs expert knowledge from economic interest 
groups to offset those limited resources. “This technical information is indispensable in 
developing effective EU legislation“ (Bouwen 2002: 8). Furthermore, as the Council 
keeps the Commission on a short leash through its various control mechanisms, the 
Commission has to anticipate positions in the Council. This is a lot easier with the sup-
port of Eurogroups, who can supply information about the aggregated interests of the 
European private sector. In this way, the Commission gains an edge in negotiations 
with the Council, who does not possess this information.  
 
Diffuse interests cannot provide the access goods that are demanded by decision-
makers and thus have markedly less access to and influence over trade policy (Dür 
2008b; Woolcock 2005: 242). This is reflected in their choice of strategy as well. While 
business groups prefer to work through their informal networks with national and EU 
institutions, civil society groups generally direct their activities at the general public 
(Mohr et al. 2005: 13f).42 
 
To sum it up, the members of the Council are dependent on the resources of national 
interest groups to secure re-election, while the Commission is dependent on the re-
sources of Eurogroups to design effective policies and increase its power relative to the 
Council.  
 
                                                
 
42  According to a survey of decision makers, network strategies are seen as much more effective than 
publicity strategies. NGOs cannot use these strategies, as a prerequisite is access (Mohr et al. 2005: 
20f). 
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Does this exchange lead to influence? 
 
If we now assume that special interest groups will sanction decision-makers whose 
policies run counter to their interests, we can expect decision-makers to give in to the 
demands of those groups to secure the resources they provide – at least to a certain 
degree.43 Blame-shirking would offer a way to reap the benefits of engaging special 
interest groups without giving them influence over policy content, but possibilities for 
this seem limited, as I will argue in section 4.3. Anyways, the empirical record as laid 
out in section 3 strongly suggests that special interest groups were indeed successful 
in translating access into influence in a broad range of cases. 
 
4.3. What this means for the collusive delegation argument 
 
Decision-makers’ incentives and the access interest groups enjoy cast doubt on 
whether the mechanisms that are supposed to insulate trade policymaking really work 
as is argued. 
 
Information asymmetries can go both ways, for example, because national govern-
ments and the Commission are dependent on informational resources provided by 
lobby groups. While the Commission and the member states do possess important 
information that interest groups do not have, the reverse is also true. Furthermore, 
concentrated interests can be expected to overcome the information asymmetries more 
easily than diffuse interests, and have advantages over diffuse interests because of the 
insider information they gain through their privileged access in the EU-polity (Beyers 
2004: 588). This should increase the impact of concentrated interests relative to diffuse 
interests. Moreover, information asymmetries in favor of EU institutions can even en-
hance the influence of special interest groups. If a decision-maker’s ability to implement 
policies that benefit concentrated interests at the expense of the general public is ham-
pered by electoral scrutiny, information asymmetries (i.e. intransparency) can make it 
easier to give in to interest groups’ demands (Dür 2008a: 31).  
 
                                                
 
43  Note, though, that it could be argued that interest groups might be content to have access without any 
real influence, as this would put them in a privileged position to monitor policy developments and give 
them an informational advantage. 
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Deutsch (1999: 61) makes a similar point for blame-shirking. According to him, reputa-
tional constraints for decision-makers are less severe at the EU-level, as public scrutiny 
there is reduced. For this reason, delegation of trade policy enables national politicians 
to blame the EU for protectionist policies. Whereas proponents of collusive delegation 
argue that blame-shirking enables politicians to pursue liberal policies, Deutsch argues 
that it enables them to pursue protectionist ones. Overall, the latter argument seems 
more plausible as blame-shirking should be more effective if directed at the general 
public than if directed at interest groups, because those can monitor more effectively 
where ultimate responsibility for a decision lies due to the access they enjoy. What is 
more, possibilities for repeated blame-shirking are limited as interest groups can be 
expected to learn from policies that do not serve them well (De Bièvre/Dür 2005: 1276).  
 
The notion of the Commission as a consistently liberal preference outlier due to its 
enlarged constituency can likewise be challenged, as the Commission is internally di-
vided on many issues. This division can appear along national lines, with Commission-
ers taking “their” country’s position which may be more protectionist or more liberal 
(Dür 2007: 834). A second division can appear between the different DGs which can be 
involved in trade negotiations (Damro 2007: 899). Particularly the DG Agriculture tends 
more towards protectionism. Moreover, as has been shown above, the Commission 
has clear incentives to engage interest groups which challenges this mechanism when 
the interest group in question has protectionist preferences.  
 
Finally, seeing the Commission as shielded from lobby influences because it is finan-
cially and electorally independent from interest groups does not capture the whole 





This paper has tried to make the case that special interest groups have a significant 
influence on EU trade policy. Specifically, it has criticized the view that trade policy was 
shielded from special interests by delegating authority to the EU level, also known as 
the collusive delegation argument. It has shown that there is little in the empirical litera-
ture to support this argument which does not prove, however, that interest groups have 
an influence over EU trade policy. Instead, I argue that in light of the finding of the last 
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section that special interest groups enjoy excellent access to decision-makers who 
have strong incentives to comply with their demands, the most likely explanation for the 
many outcomes cited in section 3 in which close correlations between the positions of 
the EU and special interest groups were observed is that these groups were able to 
exert significant influence. The alternative would be luck which is highly improbable. 
Finally, I have tried to clarify why the collusive delegation argument is little helpful in 
explaining trade policy outcomes by criticizing the causal mechanisms that proponents 
of the argument identify.  
 
I want to emphasize one final point here. It seems to me that the shortcomings of the 
collusive delegation argument stem from a misconception of the interest constellation 
in trade policy. Without taking into view both export-competing and import-competing 
interests, we cannot understand why EU trade liberalization is so selective, keeping 
sectors such as agriculture and textiles protected, while pushing for market opening in 
others like financial services and high-tech goods. Practices like tariff escalation and 
various protectionist instruments like anti-dumping duties also seem at odds with the 
collusive delegation argument, as all this, according to economic theory, is not in the 
interest of European consumers, because it keeps out cheaper goods from third coun-
tries. The picture we see is one of highly selective liberalization that closely mirrors the 
EU’s offensive and defensive trade interests.  
 
The most likely explanation for this pattern seems to be that export-competing interests 
lobbied for liberalization as Europe’s industry developed into a world leader after World 
War II, while import-competing interest groups successfully managed to keep some 
issues of particular importance to them off the agenda. In this interpretation, the EU’s 
push for liberalization in many areas only coincided with consumer interests without the 
EU actively pursuing these interests. 
 
This means that decision-makers were faced with increasingly heterogeneous de-
mands as stronger export-competing interests came into the picture (De Bièvre/Dür 
2005: 1291). In this context, the purpose of delegation of trade policy authority to the 
EU can be interpreted in a manner that is radically different from collusive delegation: 
Decision-makers delegated not because they sought to insulate themselves from lob-
bying, but to be better able to service liberal and protectionist interest groups at the 
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same time. The fragmented authority in the Commission, with specialized protectionist 





Abbott, Roderick 2008: EU Trade Policy: Approaching a crossroads, in: Chatham 
House briefing paper 08: 04. 
Aggarwal, Vinod K./Fogarty, Edward A. 2004: Explaining Trends in EU Interregional-
ism, in: Aggarwal, Vinod K./Fogarty, Edward A. (Hrsg.): EU Trade Strategies. 
Between Regionalism and Globalism, Basingstoke/New York, N. Y, 207-240. 
Antkiewicz, Agata/Momani, Bessma 2009: Pursuing Geopolitical Stability through Inter-
regional Trade: The EU’s Motives for Negotiating with the Gulf Cooperation, in: 
Journal of European Integration 31: 2, 217-235.  
Arnull, Anthony 2006: The European Union and its Court of Justice, Oxford. 
Bartolini, Stefano 2005: Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building and 
Political Structuring Between the Nation-State and the European Union, Oxford. 
Beyers, Jan 2002: Gaining and Seeking Access: The European Adaptation of Domestic 
Interest Associations, in: Journal of Political Research 41: 5, 585-612. 
Benington, John/Harvey, Janet 1998: Transnational Local Authority Networking within 
the European Union: Passing Fashion or New Paradigm Analysis, in: Marsh, 
David (Hrsg.): Comparing Policy Networks, Buckingham, 149-165. 
Bouwen, Pieter 2002: Corporate lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access, 
in: Journal of European Public Policy 9: 3, 365-390. 
Bouwen, Pieter 2004: Exchanging Access Goods for Access: A Comparative Study of 
Business Lobbying in the European Union Institutions, in: European Journal of 
Political Research 43: 3, 337-369. 
Coen, David/Grant, Wyn 2005: Business and Government in International Policymak-
ing. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue as an Emerging Business Style?, in: 
Kelly, Dominic/Grant, Wyn (Hrsg.): The Politics of International Trade in the 
Twenty-First Century: Actors, Issues and Regional Dynamics, Basingstoke, 47-
70. 
Corporate Europe Observatory 2009: Commission Paying No More Than Lip-Service to 
Dialogue, in: www.corporateeurope.org/global-europe/content/2009/05/lip-
service-civilsociety-dialogue, 16 June 2009. 
Cowles, Maria Green 2001: The Transatlantic Business Dialogue and Domestic Busi-
ness – Government Relations, in Cowles, Maria Green /Caporaso, James 
A./Risse, Thomas (Hrsg.): Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic 
Political Change, Ithaca, NY, 159-179. 
Commission 2006: Global Europe: Competing in the World – A Contribution to the EU’s 
Growth and Jobs Strategy, in: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/-
october/tradoc_130370.pdf; 16 June 2009. 
  30
Commission 2008: LDCs Bilateral Trade with the EU and Trade with the World: DG 
Trade Statistics, in: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/-
tradoc_113484.pdf; 16 June 2009. 
Damro, Chad 2007: EU Delegation and Agency in International Trade Negotiations: A 
Cautionary Comparison, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 45: 4, 883-903. 
De Bièvre, Dirk 2006: The EU Regulatory Trade Agenda and the Quest for WTO En-
forcement, in: Journal of European Public Policy 13: 6, 851-866. 
De Bièvre, Dirk/Dür, Andreas 2005: Constituency Interests and Delegation in European 
and American Trade Policy, in: Comparative Political Studies 38: 10, 1271-
1296. 
De Bièvre, Dirk/Dür, Andreas 2007: Inclusion without Influence? NGOs in European 
Trade Policy, in: Journal of Public Policy 27: 1, 79-101. 
Destler, Irving M. 1996: American Trade Politics, Washington DC. 
Dür, Andreas 2007: EU Trade Policy as Protection for Exporters: The Agreements with 
Mexico and Chile, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 45: 4, 833-855. 
Dür, Andreas 2008a: Bringing Economic Interests Back Into the Study of EU Trade 
Policy-Making, in: British Journal of Politics and International Relations 10: 1, 
27-45. 
Dür, Andreas 2008b: Interest Groups in the European Union: How Powerful Are They?, 
in:  West European Politics 31: 6, 1212-1230. 
Dür, Andreas 2008c: Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note on Meth-
odology, in: European Union Politics, 9: 4, 559–576. 
Dür, Andreas/Zimmermann, Hubert 2007: Introduction: The EU in International Trade 
Negotiations, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 45: 4, 771-787.  
Eising, Rainer 2004: Multilevel Governance and Business Interests in the European 
Union, in: Governance 17: 2, 211-245. 
Eurostat 2009: External and Intra-European Union Trade – Data 2002-2007, in: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-CV-08-001/EN/KS-
CV-08-001-EN.PDF; 16 June 2009. 
Falkner, Gerda 2000: Policy Networks in a Multilevel System. Converging Towards 
Moderate Diversity?, in: West European Politics 23: 4, 94-120. 
Frey, Bruno S./Buhofer, Heinz 1986: Integration and Protectionism: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis, in: Außenwirtschaft 41: 2-3, 167-188. 
Fritz, Heiko 2004: Die politische Ökonomie der Handelspolitik der Europäischen Union. 
Eine institutionenorientierte Analyse der Handelsliberalisierung zwischen der 
EU und Mittel- und Osteuropa. Dissertation at Europa-Universität Viadrina, 
Frankfurt (Oder). 
Gerlach, Carina 2006: Does Business Really Run EU Trade Policy? Observations 
about EU Trade Policy Lobbying, in: Politics 26: 3, 176-183.  
Hayes-Renshaw, Fiona/Wallace, Helen 1997: The Council of Ministers, New York. 
Hocking, Brian/McGuire, Steven 2002: Government–Business Strategies in EU–US 
Economic Relations: The Lessons of the Foreign Sales Corporations Issue, in: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 40: 3, 449-470. 
Johnson, Michael 1998: European Community Trade Policy and the Article 133 Com-
mittee, London. 
  31
Kahler, Miles 1985: European Protectionism in Theory and Practice, in: World Politics 
37: 4, 475-502.  
Keeler, John T.S. 1996: Agricultural Power in the European Community: Explaining the 
Fate of CAP and GATT Negotiations, in: Comparative Politics 28: 2, 127-149. 
Kriesi, Hanspeter/Tresch, Anke/Jochum, Margit 2007: Going Public in the European 
Union: Action Repertoires of Western European Collective Political Actors, in: 
Comparative Political Studies 40: 1, 48-73. 
Kröger, Sandra 2008: Nothing but Consultation: The Place of Organized Civil Society in 
EU Policy-Making across Policies, in: European Governance Paper Series, 
www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-08-03.pdf; 16 June 2009. 
Lüttiken, Florian 2006: Die Europäische Handelspolitik in GATT/WTO. Nationale Au-
ßenpolitiken und ihr Einfluss auf die Handelspolitik der Europäischen Kommis-
sion am Beispiel der Verhandlungen zur Uruguay-Runde, Baden-Baden. 
Matyja, Miroslaw 2007: Interessenverbände im Entscheidungsprozess der Europä-
ischen Union, in: Kleinfeld, Ralf/Zimmer, Annette/Willems, Ulrich (Hrsg.): Lob-
bying. Strukturen, Akteure, Strategien, Wiesbaden, 148-168. 
Mazey, Sonia/Richardson, Jeremy 2003: Interest Groups and the Brussels Bureauc-
racy, in: Hayward, Jack/Menon, Anand (Hrsg.): Governing Europe, Oxford, 208-
229. 
Mazey, Sonia/Richardson, Jeremy 2006: Interest Groups and EU Policy-Making, in: 
Richardson, Jeremy (Hrsg.): European Union: Power and Policy-Making, Lon-
don, 217-237. 
Moravcsik, Andrew 1994: Why the European Community Strengthens the State Do-
mestic Politics and International Institutions, in: Center for European Studies 
Working Paper Series 52.  
Messerlin, Patrick A. 2001: Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe: European 
Commercial Policy in the 2000s, Washington, DC. 
Meunier, Sophie (2005): Trading Voices: The European Community in International 
Commercial Negotiations, Princeton. 
Nicolaïdis, Kalypso/Meunier, Sophie 2002: Revisiting Trade Competence in the Euro-
pean Union: Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond, in: Hosli, Madeleine O./van Dee-
men, Adrian/Wildgrén, Mika (Hrsg.): Institutional Challenges in the European 
Union, London, 173-201. 
Niemann, Arne 2004: Between Communicative Action and Strategic Action: The Article 
113 Committee and the Negotiations on the WTO Basic Telecommunications  
Services Agreement, in: Journal of European Public Policy 11: 3, 379 – 407. 
Nugent, Neill 2006: The Government and Politics of the European Union, Houndmills. 
O’Halloran, Sharyn 1994: Politics, Process and American Trade Policy, Ann Arbor. 
Olson, Mancur 1971: The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups, Cambridge, MA. 
Oxfam/Christian Aid/Action Aid (2008): European Free Trade Agreements Manual, in: 
www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/euftamanuals.html; 16 June 2009. 
Sapir, Andre 1998: The Political Economy of EC Regionalism, in: European Economic  
Review 42: 3, 717-732. 
  32
Schmidt, Vivien A. 1999: The EU and Its Member-States: Institutional Contrasts and 
Their Consequences, in: MPIfG Working Paper 99:7. 
Seattle-to-Brussels-Network 2006: Stop the EU’s Corporate Trade Agenda!, in: 
www.wtorunde.de/uploads/briefing_corporate_trade_agenda.pdf; 16 June 2009.  
Stieglitz, Joseph E./Griffith-Jones, Stephany 2007: Growth with Responsibility in a 
Globalized World: Findings of the Shadow G-8, in: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Oc-
casional Papers No. 31, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04472.pdf; 16 
June 2009. 
UNICE 1999: UNICE Position Paper on European Agricultural Policy and World Trade, 
in: www.commercialdiplomacy.org/sampledocuments_htm/Agriculture/Euro-
pean_Employers.pdf; 16 June 2009. 
Van den Hoven, Adrian 2002: Interest Group Influence on Trade Policy in a Multilevel 
Polity: Analysing the EU position at the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference, in: 
EUI Working Paper 2002: 67. 
Von Schöppenthau, Philip 1999: Die Europäische Union als Akteur der Internationalen 
Handelspolitik. Die Textilverhandlungen der GATT-Uruguay-Runde, Wiesba-
den.  
WEED 2009: Global Europe konkret, in: www.weed-online.org/themen/wto/global/-
2116869.html; 16 June 2009. 
Woolcock, Stephen 2000: European Trade Policy. Global Pressures and Domestic 
Constraints, in: Wallace, Helen/Wallace, William (Hrsg.): Policy-Making in the 
European Union, 4. Auflage, Oxford. 
Woolcock, Stephen 2005: European Union Trade Policy: Domestic Institutions and 
Systemic Factors, in: Kelly, Dominic/Grant, Wyn (Hrsg.): The Politics of Interna-
tional Trade in the Twenty-First Century. Actors, Issues and Regional Dynam-
ics, Basingstoke, 234-252. 
Woolcock, Stephen 2007: European Union Policy towards Free Trade Agreements, in: 
ECIPE Working Papers 2007: 03.  
Zimmermann, Hubert 2006: Wege zur Drachenzähmung. Die EU und die USA in den 














Berliner Arbeitspapiere zur Europäischen Integration 
Berlin Working Paper on European Integration 
 
1 Tanja A. Börzel: European Governance. Verhandlungen und Wettbewerb im 
Schatten der Hierarchie, April 2007 
2 Franziska Süllke: Young People and Active European Citizenship. Strengthen-
ing Opportunities for Citizenship Education on a Local Level. Examples from 
Practice under Difficult Conditions, Mai 2007 
3 Sabine von Oppeln: Das Europäische Sozialmodell. Bilanz und Perspektiven, 
September 2007 
4 Diana Panke: Why the ECJ Restores Compliance Faster in Some Cases Than 
in Others. Comparing Germany and the UK, Oktober 2007 
5 Osvaldo Saldías: Supranational Courts as Engines of Disintegration. The Case 
of the Andean Community, November 2007 
6 Jana Katharina Grabowsky: Mehr als Wirtschaft. Der Beitrag des Airbusprojekts 
zur europäischen Identität, November 2007 
7 Tanja A. Börzel, Yasemin Pamuk, Andreas Stahn: Good Governance in the 
European Union, Januar 2008 
8 Martin Humburg: The Open Method of Coordination and Integration. The Exam-
ple of European Education Policy, Juni 2008 
9 Vera van Hüllen: Transnationalising Euro-Mediterranean Relations. The Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network as an Intermediary Actor, November 
2008 
10 Claudio Franzius: Warum Governance?, Februar 2009 
11 Tanja A. Börzel und Thomas Risse: Venus Approaching Mars? The European 
Union as an Emerging Civilian World Power, April 2009 
12 Julian Schwartzkopff: Splendid Isolation? The Influence of Interest Groups on 
EU Trade Policy, August 2009 
 
